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Abstract Since the revolutionary mood of the 1960s,
patient-centered mental health care and a research emphasis
on service users as experts by experience have emerged
hand in hand with a view of service users as consumers.
What happens to knowledge derived from firsthand expe-
rience when mental health users become experts and
actively choose care? What kind of perspective do service
users pursue on psychological distress? These are important
questions in a field where psychiatric expertise on mental
illness is socially structured and constrained as an intra-
personal disturbance of the mind. We argue that experience
experts have lost a coherent perspective on care and health.
We illustrate this by rationally reconstructing how the
interpersonal view of mental health first gained and then lost
coherence between the conception of mental health, the
practice of mental health care, and the user experience.
Harry Stack Sullivan’s interpersonal theory was a paradigm
case for such coherence. The inclusion of mental health
consumers as ‘experts by experience’ in the mental health
field took place at the cost of Sullivan’s coherent interper-
sonal theory. Service users who interact side by side with
medical experts as experience experts are constrained by the
evidence-based imperative and consumerism. Service users
are caught up in a race among experts to gain knowledge
about mental problems from a third-person perspective
instead of from first-person experience. To make a contri-
bution service users have more to gain from a research
approach that appreciates that they are persons among per-
sons rather than experts among experts.
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Introduction
During recent decades, users of mental health services have
steadily increased the strength of their voice in mental
health care policies, education and practice (WHO 2010).
Patient-centered care, with its emphasis on the patient’s
voice and choice, has become a common good in mental
health care (Dahlberg et al. 2009), and service users acting
as ‘experts by experience’ are pivotal in their own care and
treatment plans (Pilgrim 2008).
One can wonder what happened to knowledge derived
from firsthand experience when mental health service users
themselves became experts and actively began to choose
care. What perspectives on mental health do experts by
experience endorse? The ensuing expertise is socially
structured and constrained in terms of mental illness being a
psychopathological intra-personal disturbance of the mind,
in line with dominant psychiatric practice (Speed 2005;
Bracken and Thomas 2005; Coles et al. 2013). However,
alternative views on mental health are also endorsed; mental
health can be seen as a relational phenomenon which is
never static, in line with so-called relation-based mental
health work. In such views, mental health cannot be reduced
to brain activity or individual life histories, but emerges in
and through processes of interaction between the person and
other persons (Bracken and Thomas 2005; Crossley 2011;
Frie and Coburn 2010; Kirschner and Martin 2010). In our
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study, we take a closer look at the expertise that users as
consumers bring to the mental health care field and how
their views on mental health have developed vis-a`-vis the
mainstream psychiatric view. In doing so, we will try to
unravel the apparent paradox that experts by experience
become part of the dominant medical paradigm they wished
to move away from. In other words, in this study, we ask to
what extent mental health users are ‘experts among experts’
at the expense of being ‘persons among persons’.
We approach these questions by generating a rational
reconstruction of how the interpersonal (person among
persons) view of mental health first gained and then lost
coherence among its conceptions of mental health, the
practice of mental health care, and the experience of the
user. By rational reconstruction, we mean that it is only on
the basis of what we know of user knowledge in mental
health care today that we can reconstruct how this has come
to be so. Moreover, we study how past participants in mental
health argued and thought in order to revive their voices in
the present-day context, enabling us to create a dialogue
between these and currently active players in the field. We
acknowledge the risk of writing whiggish history but find
support in Rorty, who writes that ‘‘such enterprises in
commensuration are, of course, anachronistic. But if they are
conducted in full knowledge of their anachronism, they are
unobjectable’’ (Rorty cited in Oniscik 2005, p. 245).
In the following, we first describe H.S. Sullivan’s mid-
twentieth century interpersonal psychiatry, because it is a
paradigmatic example of a coherent approach based on an
interpersonal view of mental health. Secondly, we address
how Sullivan’s coherence was lost by those whom he
inspired to revolt against psychiatry, i.e., both anti-psy-
chiatrists and service users. Thirdly, we show how a part-
nership between service users and mental health
professionals paved the way for a shared acceptance of the
breaking up of mental health into independent parameters.
We discuss the consequences of a parametric view of
mental health in terms of standardized mental health and
the subsequent logic of choice in mental health services
(Kugelmann 2003; Mol 2008). We conclude with the
suggestion that a humanistic approach to mental health can
allow for the voice of the service user as a person among
persons rather than an expert among experts.
Sullivan’s coherent interpersonal approach
Sullivan (1892–1949) has been credited for being the first
to formulate an explicitly interpersonal theory of psychia-
try, by psychiatrists as well as by service users in the
so-called ‘recovery’ literature (Davidson et al. 2010; Perry
1982). He formulated an interpersonal theory of the self,
mental disorder, treatment and recovery. The theory was
formulated in a series of lectures during the period
1946–1947, which were published together in the book The
interpersonal theory of psychiatry (Sullivan et al. 1953).
Sullivan lived his interpersonal theory by creating a ther-
apeutic setting in which the psychiatrist could participate in
the everyday activities of the clinic. He saw himself as a
person among other persons in any patient’s social world.
Sullivan strongly believed that the self-contained individ-
ual with a unique individuality was an illusion. He criti-
cized society’s focus on the individual and how the medical
model of psychiatry sustained this view, referring to this as
‘‘the very mother of illusions, the ever pregnant source of
preconceptions that invalidate almost all our efforts to
understand other people’’ (Sullivan 2000/1938, p. 114). To
Sullivan there is a different self in each interpersonal
relationship, and the person has as many understandings of
him- or herself as he or she has interpersonal relationships.
The self is fundamentally social in nature and ‘‘personality
is the relatively enduring pattern of recurrent interpersonal
situations which characterize a human life’’ (Sullivan 1953,
p. 110–111). The ideal of human maturity and indepen-
dence leads us to believe that we are dependent on others
only when we feel ill (Sullivan et al. 1970, p. 35). How-
ever, in Sullivan’s view, health and illness are both facets
of living as a person among persons (Sullivan 1953,
p. 313).
Sullivan’s view of mental disorder was consistent with
his interpersonal view of the self. He was inspired by
Meyer’s psychobiology, which endeavored to abandon a
dualistic spilt between body and mind (Dowbiggin 2011),
seeing them as two aspects of the same process. Like
Meyer, Sullivan argued that mental illness comes from
problems with living and adjustment to society. If a person
is unable to adjust to or withstand the social organization in
which he is embedded but experiences this organization as
important, mental illness can develop (Sullivan 1953,
p. 208). In this way Sullivan envisioned a continuum
between mental health and illness; a person suffering from
a mental illness is not fundamentally different from any
other person. Hence Sullivan’s famous one-genus postulate
which states that ‘‘everyone is much more simply human
than otherwise’’ (Sullivan 1953, p. 32; italics in the
original).
Sullivan emphasized the importance of taking part in the
patient’s everyday life as a participating observer and lis-
tening to his or her point of view, which is a crucial aspect
of making a social recovery. For several years he lived and
worked on a daily basis among schizophrenic patients.
When he was given a patient’s story by a staff member,
Sullivan could refer to this story as a ‘‘wonderful works of
clinical fiction’’ (Havens 2000, p. 129). He read first-person
accounts about living in a psychiatric ward, such as the
self-biographical book by Beers, a pioneer of the mental
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health movement of the first half of the 19th century, who
underscored the relevance of the local community for any
person’s mental health. Sullivan conceived of the psychi-
atric ward as a self-standing social world, implying psy-
chiatric care and treatment during the other 23 h (Bloom
2002). At the psychiatric hospital, he established a one-
class society and did everything to minimize the impact of
his own status. He hand-picked male attendants and
patients in recovery to staff the ward and taught them his
‘‘socio-psychiatric program’’ in which the schizophrenic
patient was to partake as a ‘‘person among persons’’ (Conci
1997, p. 131; italics in the original).
With this backdrop, we can state that Sullivan had a
coherent interpersonal view of the self, mental health and
treatment. With hindsight, we can characterize this approach
as ‘relational’, a view in which body and mind feature as an
embodied self within a situation where mental health and
illness are ways of experiencing and acting in situations and
where mental health care takes place in a situation between
two persons who meet as persons, attempting social recov-
ery through participant observation rather than medical
treatment of an alien body. In the next two sections, we aim
to show how this coherence in Sullivan’s approach was lost
in the work of those whom he inspired: anti-psychiatry and
the user movement in mental health care.
Anti-psychiatry: the revolt from above
Sullivan inspired the psychiatrists T. Szasz (1920–2012) and
R. D. Laing (1927–1989) to develop their own ideas about
mental disorders and care in a revolt against mainstream
psychiatry, the so-called anti-psychiatry of the 1960s and
1970s. Crossley (1998) describes their work as a ‘‘revolt
from above’’ (p. 878), implying a skeptical stance towards
psychiatry as an instance of power and social control. Anti-
psychiatry was never a broad revolutionary movement with
the intent to demolish the mental health field, but rather an
attempt to promote a new paradigm to normalize madness by
placing behavior in an interpersonal context rather than an
allegedly narrow, normative context that sustains a con-
trolling, medical, and objectifying gaze at patients. The anti-
psychiatrists argued that symptoms of mental illness are
easier to understand if context is taken into account.
Sullivan’s approach impressed Szasz (2010, p. 220) with
his portrayal of disease as ‘‘problems in living’’. Though
skeptical of the anti-psychiatry label, Szasz famously held
that mental illness is a myth. Mind is not brain, he argued;
behavior cannot be a disease and is not detectable as a
physical defect within the individual. Phenomena studied
by psychiatrists, such as racism, suicide, and murder,
cannot be revealed through studies of the brain. In his view,
the psychiatric establishment exercised negative power
over psychiatric patients by depriving them of the rights to
self-determination and freedom and the right to be regarded
as citizens who can take the consequences of their own
actions. Seen in this light, psychiatry is ‘‘an ideology and a
technology for the radical remaking of man’’ (Szasz 1973,
p. 11).
Szasz maintained that the medical model was not suit-
able to help people with their personal, social and ethical
problems with living (Szasz 2010, p. 262). Hardship for
modern man derives ‘‘from stresses and strains inherent in
the social intercourse of complex human personalities’’
(Szasz 1973, p. 14). Difficulties in human relations must be
analyzed and given meaning merely within specific social
and ethical contexts. Problems of living, as Szasz (1973,
p. 22) contended, are due to man’s awareness of himself in
an expanding world and the increasing ‘‘burden of under-
standing’’; however, modernity and man’s increasing
knowledge do not take away the individual’s responsibility
for his or her actions by hiding it in the notion of mental
illness. Szasz gave his patients the choice whether to work
or not. The therapist is not responsible for the patient’s
actions, only the patient him- or herself, and any preoc-
cupation with the therapist is a way of not attending to
one’s own life. Szasz, as the libertine he was, encouraged
his patients to assume responsibility and develop a self that
was independent of the therapist as a way out of their
problems with living.
Laing was another important anti-psychiatrist (Crossley
1998). He concurs with Sullivan’s well-known assertion
that the psychotic person is primarily ‘‘simply human’’
(Laing 2010, p. 34). Human beings may exist in isolation
but are first and foremost intimately related to other per-
sons and the world. It may be in one’s own family that
mental illness first emerges. Problems of living arise when
the person is placed in a situation of conflicting expecta-
tions from family members (Laing and Esterson 1970). For
Laing, mental illness was a normal response to a mad
world and thereby socially intelligible (op cit. p. 27).
Actions are embedded in meaningful contexts, not con-
trolled settings, and therefore, Laing argued, existential
problems can arise that are beyond the person’s control.
When lacking a solid foundation of existence, the person
can experience an ontological insecurity and become
‘‘preoccupied with preserving rather than gratifying him-
self’’ (Laing 2010, p. 42). An ontologically insecure indi-
vidual dreads engulfment by the other, implosion into
complete emptiness and transformation into a dead thing
(Laing 2010, p. 43). When failing to come up with a unique
voice, the person may experience a lack of autonomy and
become intertwined with the other.
To Laing, people with so-called mental illness are trying
to find their way back; psychotic episodes are under-
standable as an attempt to communicate worries and
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concerns, often in situations where this was not possible or
not permitted. They should thus be seen as ‘‘self-acting
agents’’, responsible and capable of choice (Laing 2010,
p. 22). In Laing’s view, the person needs help to cultivate
such independence; accordingly he set up therapeutic
communities—the most famous being Kinsley Hall—with
the aim to support the person through his or her own
voyage.
Szasz and Laing both see the psychiatric patient as a
person—more human than anything else—having prob-
lems with living. Mental suffering develops within a net-
work of social relationships. Thus far, they follow
Sullivan’s relational thinking. However, where Sullivan
followed through with a relational view of the self and
mental health care, Szasz and Laing emphasize an inde-
pendent self as the driving force to break out of unhealthy
social relationships (Bracken and Thomas 2005). More
often than not, human relationships were the problem, and
becoming a ‘self-standing’ individual was the solution.
Szasz proclaimed individual liberty and independence;
persons can make their own choices, solve their own
problems and are responsible for their actions. Laing sug-
gested ways that the person might cultivate a more inde-
pendent self and urged for freedom and subjectivity. Thus,
they generated the confusion of offering interpersonal care
to an autonomous self. Hence, the anti-psychiatrists,
through the voices of Szasz and Laing, did not maintain the
coherent relational view of self, mental disorder, and
mental health care that had typified Sullivan.
The mental health service user movement: the revolt
from below
While anti-psychiatry revolted from above, at the deliver-
ing end of mental health care, those at the receiving end of
psychiatry also let their voices be heard, initiating a revolt
from below (Crossley 1998, p. 878). Judi Chamberlin
(1944–2010), an active leader in the user movement, notes
that users of mental health services considered anti-psy-
chiatry largely an intellectual exercise of academics with
little willingness to reach out to struggling ex-patients and
their perspectives (Chamberlin 1990). Initially, user
movements may have been nurtured by the anti-psychiatry
movement’s critique of psychiatry’s standard medical
model and the everyday life it generated in the psychiatric
ward, providing a joint platform for individuals who had
expressed similar criticism, such as Beers (1908) and
Packard (cf. Dowbiggin 2011). However, user groups were
also eager to create an identity formulated in positive
terms, separate from anti-psychiatry. The user movements
merged with a larger class struggle, the ‘counter-culture’ of
the 1960s, which provided impetus and legitimacy
(Reaume 2002). The user movement mushroomed into
many different user organizations with different agendas
and ideologies, and even controversy among themselves,
but with a shared belief in the rights to interpret their own
experiences of mental disorder, to self-determination and to
help on their own terms (Barnes and Cotterell 2012).
The first-person singular voice of a few patients in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had thereby
gradually developed into a first-person plural identity as
‘patients/users’, ‘consumers’, or ‘survivors’ (McLean
2010; Pilgrim 2005). Through narratives from former
patients, an entirely new form of self-awareness based on
common experiences emerged. Service users went from
formalized ascribed roles to a growing self-consciousness
and self-confidence that was anchored in their unique
understanding of their own illness. They did not subscribe
to the anti-psychiatric claim that mental illness is not a
disease but rather confirmed its status by becoming the new
experts on mental illness. As experience experts side by
side with medical experts, the majority of user organiza-
tions have now turned from an anti-establishment move-
ment into a consumer coalition (Rissmiller and Rissmiller
2006). As consumers, mental health service users have
acquired much of the equality they aspired to through
grass-roots lobbying rather than by radical revolt and have
made ‘‘peace with the mental health establishment [with]
no sympathy for Szasz’s theory that mental health is a
myth’’ (Dowbiggin 2011, p. 168).
The improvement in equality between service user and
provider is based on a shared understanding of mental ill-
ness as a medical disease, i.e., as an individual’s ‘bad
genes’ or ‘broken brain’ (Adame and Knudson 2008). That
is to say that while the user movement strengthened the
user voice, a Sullivan-like interpersonal conception of
mental health was weakened in favor of a intrapersonal
conception of mental health; it is only such a conception
that allows one to acquire and express experiential
expertise.
Standardized versus relational health
Why are the voices of experts by experience unable to give
us a coherent perspective on care and health? To explore
this question we use Kugelmann’s (2003) distinction
between ‘‘standardized health’’ and ‘‘being healthy.’’
According to Kugelmann (2003), standardized health
appears when norms and risk factors are determined by
biomedicine, and biomedicine intersects with an economic
definition of wellbeing. Parameters of health are turned into
medical and economic parameters. Lived experiences are
turned into third-person objective categories of sickness
and are thus not the health of any particular person; given
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are statistical averages in the intersection of biomedicine
and economy. Science and health care are increasingly
organized like businesses (Gadamer 1996).
Transposed to mental health, standardized mental health
can be compared with a Procrustean bed that reduces and
deforms its object. The first-person narratives of relational
experience of distress, suffering and healing are made into
parts of value-free parameters by health care providers and
patients. These parameters influence service users’ behav-
ior in such a way that they identify themselves with con-
structed labels even though all they may have in common is
the wide range of parameters used to categorize them. They
become exposed ‘‘to the anonymity of the clinical appa-
ratus’’ (Gadamer 1996, p. 20). Service users are caught in a
double bind. They become dependent on the classifications
of diseases to attain support because the socially significant
outcome that determines different forms of interventions is
what constitutes sickness (Young 1982). To put it differ-
ently, the sickness does not define the intervention as much
as the intervention defines the sickness. Mental health work
materializes as a series of direct relational interventions to
standardize these parameters. However, what happens
when service users claim to be experts on their disease?
The immediate grasp of the life world disappears the
moment the service user raises a question from an expert
perspective or third person perspective about his or her
disease. The life world is no longer experienced but con-
sidered as if in the third-person plural. In other words, they
become part of the problem of the reification of mental
health.
In the emerging partnership, service users become part
of the family of professionals who, by their ‘expertise of
subjectivity’, can classify, measure, diagnose and prescribe
remedies for psychologic illnesses (Rose 1989). Users as
experience experts are trapped in a race to keep up with
professional experts, as they do their own research, write
their stories, campaign politically, etc. Accordingly, the
more users invest in becoming experts among experts, the
farther they become removed from the relational ‘persons
among persons’ view of mental health work. In racing
‘upwards’ to become experts, they are captured in what
Hacking (1999) termed the ‘looping effect’, where con-
ceptual labels of mental health evoke new behaviors and
where original behaviors may give rise to new labels. It
implies that help-seekers’ descriptions of their experience
of mental health interact with the professional knowledge
that categorizes them in the first place (Dehue 2009). This
profoundly illuminates the idea that when service user
expertise stands on equal footing with research results and
professional judgment, user experience is a moot contri-
bution to evidence-based treatment and social support.
To sustain an alternative to the intrapersonal conception
of mental health, it has been argued that user groups need
to return to their roots (Lakeman et al. 2007). They need an
approach where the person is portrayed in terms of lived
experience; one cannot portray a person purely from out-
side as a ‘‘mere object of biological, psychological or
sociological investigation’’ (Merleau-Ponty 2002, p. ix).
The person and the world belong together and are insepa-
rable; the interpersonal aspect of illness cannot be sepa-
rated from the person’s lived experience (Van den Berg
1972). An alternative is required where standardized
mental health is replaced by perspectives that capture the
experience of being mentally healthy.
According to Kugelmann (2003), being healthy is a
relational experience; one is not separated from lived
experience but rather effortlessly engaged with others
in situations in the world. He adopts Gadamer’s (1996)
view that health is not ‘‘something that can simply be made
or produced’’ (p. vii)… ‘‘it is a condition of being involved
… being together with one’s fellow human beings’’ (p.
113). In this perspective, being mentally healthy involves
becoming engaged in something—caring about something
meaningful, for oneself, for family and friends. Such a
perspective on mental health rests on a relational view of
the person, and should cohere with a relational view of
care.
Logic of choice versus logic of care
The preoccupation with user voice and choice is grounded
in a logic that enforces a split between the person and the
world. To make this point we use Mol’s (2008) distinction
between the ‘‘logic of choice’’ and the ‘‘logic of care.’’ In
the logic of choice, professionals are preoccupied with
what patients want and opt for. The autonomous patient’s
right to choose dictates healthcare. The role of profes-
sionals is then to provide users with care options to choose
from. In the logic of care, by contrast, professionals and
patients are not concerned with choice but with what one
actually does. In this logic, one’s ability to act depends on
others in a continuing process that ‘‘goes on and on until
the day you die’’ (Mol 2008, p. 62).
In the pas de deux between service users and profes-
sionals, good treatment is realized when the service user’s
voice is heard and when mental health workers emphasize
the service user’s choices. More choice is regarded as the
road to better mental health, and it is logical to think that if
some choice is good, more is better. Schwartz (2004)
argues, however, that in a psychological sense this
assumption may be wrong. Although some choice is
undoubtedly better than none, more is not always better
than less in the caring industry. Too many choices can raise
your expectations to an unrealistic level, and it can make
you blame yourself for any failures. You can blame
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yourself for not making a choice that is more or less per
impossible. However, the options of choice differ with
one’s situation in the world. A good swimmer and a person
who cannot swim well do not have the same experience of
autonomy when choosing whether to save a drowning man
(Merleau-Ponty 2002, p. 508).
In the logic of choice, the individual is disengaged from
the world. The world materializes as a conglomerate of
neutral objects or facts that are detached from the indi-
vidual. The individual engaged in the world is replaced by
an individual looking at the world as sheer facts from a
third-person perspective, and in this way ‘‘gives up living’’
(Merleau-Ponty 1964, p. 159) in it, failing to see that we
‘‘live in it from the inside’’ (p. 178). However, in the lived
world of care, we cannot simply separate subject from
object or values from facts as these are internally related.
Mol (2008) argues that care has little to do with separate
individuality and user choice because care is attuned to
people with respect to their basic relationship to one
another. Mol puts forward an alternative logic of care
where the self emerges in interpersonal situations in
everyday living. In the logic of care, individuals are not
ensnared in causal chains. Care is always situational, and it
does not make an unbridgeable distinction between fact
and value. Facts are not just neutral facts; in the logic of
care, one attends to facts and values jointly (Mol 2008). In
the context of care, knowledge is not information to pro-
vide a better map of reality to gradually increase certainty
before risk but to gather knowledge is a way ‘‘of crafting
more bearable ways of living with, or in reality’’ (p. 46;
italics in the original). Care cannot be separated from
experience, and therefore care aims to improve the situa-
tion that ‘‘meddles with every detail of our daily lives’’
(Mol 2008, p. 37). Care appears as tinkering, dealing with
the messiness and quirkiness of everyday life, in our rela-
tionships with the world, others, and self, over time. In the
relational perspective, care is not receiving care, or
choosing care, but engaging in care with professionals as
much as oneself in an environment which may facilitate or
hamper it.
In Mol’s analysis of the logic of choice, the collective
user voice is formed by individuals who are facing similar
problems in living, share a diagnosis, or get the same type
of treatment. The user voice acquires strength by adding
more individual, autonomous voices. The users influence
the market as consumers, and as citizens the sum of their
votes may bring about democratic decisions. However, in
the logic of care, the collective aspect forms the starting
point of reasoning. The person is embedded in the family
tradition, or is immersed in the work climate, with all of the
habits and customs involved. In this view, the community
is not one of ‘added equals’, but of entangled roles in a
relational network, where not everybody is characterized
by the same health- or illness-related variable. Yet, within
the network, mental health can become the focal point at
which the actions of persons in the network are directed.
The person and his or her mental health are not charac-
terized by open choices, but rather by living as making a
plethora of small adjustments in a network of relationships
to improve one’s existence.
Concluding remarks
The current demand by mental health service users for a
stronger voice and more choice is a positive development
because users then take center stage in the practice of care.
Service users are driven to seek care and treatment within
the system of knowledge they once denied but that defines
and negotiates their life world by standardizing values.
Those service users who strive for equality between users
and providers of care have the opportunity to contribute to
care and treatment on a par with providers, insofar as this is
practically possible. However, this implies that service
users who become experts among experts maintain and
uphold the pivotal contribution of care providers.
While users have acquired an influential presence as
experts among experts, they also have gradually distanced
themselves from being persons among persons. We suggest
that instead of users climbing ‘upwards’ to become experts,
research should reach ‘downwards’ and focus more on
mental health as a relational ‘persons among persons’
phenomenon.
Mental health emerges as a lived relational phenomenon
between I-oriented persons among persons, whereas it
emerges as a reified object when discussed among They-
oriented experts. These two different views on mental
health are endorsed by different treatment and care prac-
tices but also by different systems of knowledge. Those
who take a relational perspective on mental health argue
that mental health emerges continually in time, in the
world, in the body and in relationships with significant
others and cannot be objectified to standardized parameters
within an autonomous self (Crossley 2011; Frie and Co-
burn 2010; Martin et al. 2010). Such a relational under-
standing of mental health requires a human scientific
approach that is ‘‘in tune with the essence of human
beings’’ (Giorgi 1985, p. 20), a science that is close to
practice and anchored in life worlds (Todres et al. 2007,
Dahlberg et al. 2009).
The choice of a human scientific approach to mental
health implies criticism of powerful governmental
demands for evidence-based mental health care in which
biomedical access to the patient’s experiences of illness
makes the management of human beings become all the
more powerful and coercive (Taussig 1980). However, it is
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also a critique of those service users who strive to become
experts among experts and start to see themselves in a
medical and perhaps even economic light. McKnight
(1995) argues in his book ‘‘The Careless Society’’ that
‘‘revolutions begin when people who are defined as prob-
lems achieve the power to redefine the problem’’ (p. 16).
The spark of a revolution from above in the anti-psychiatric
critique of the legitimacy of experts’ power to define others
disappeared when the revolt from below ebbed out into a
consumer movement with service users who were eager to
collaborate. What we need is a new service user movement
grounded outside reductionist standardized health in a logic
that encourages a new understanding of what experience of
life is as a person among persons.
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